Users often struggle to create passwords under strict re quirements. To make this process easier, some providers present real-time feedback during password creation, indi cating which requirements are not yet met. Other providers guide users through a multi-step password-creation process. Our 6,435-participant online study examines how feedback and guidance affect password security and usability. We find that real-time password-creation feedback can help users cre ate strong passwords with fewer errors. We also find that al though guiding participants through a three-step passwordcreation process can make creation easier, it may result in weaker passwords. Our results suggest that service providers should present password requirements with feedback to in crease usability. However, the presentation of feedback and guidance must be carefully considered, since identical re quirements can have different security and usability effects depending on presentation.
INTRODUCTION
Service providers ask for complex passwords. For exam ple, Yahoo requires passwords with at least eight charac ters and multiple character classes. 1 Users often have dif ficulty meeting complex password requirements and resort to predictable and insecure choices, such as appending dig its or symbols, or including common substrings or keyboard 1 https://edit.yahoo.com/registration Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the Owner/Author.
Copyright is held by the owner/author(s). patterns [15, 16, 19] . Some service providers now offer re quirements feedback: real-time password-creation feedback telling users whether they have met the requirements, such as green check marks indicating satisfied requirements (Fig  ure 1 ). Other service providers offer guidance: walking users through a multi-step password-creation process ( Figure 2 ).
In this paper, we present the first analysis of the usability of requirements feedback and guidance mechanisms. Prior work has considered the security and usability effects of complex password-composition requirements [9] and examined feed back specifically in the context of password meters that pro vide estimates of password strength [3, 17] . We studied tech niques intended to help users successfully navigate difficult requirements. Using a 6,435-participant, between-subjects online study, we considered real-time requirements feedback for three strict composition policies. For one policy, we ex amined two approaches to multi-step password-creation. In guidance, we guided participants to enhance a simple pass word by adding components until it met all requirements. In insertion, inspired by Forget et al. [5] , participants created a simple password and the system inserted random characters. We tested how these approaches affect users' ability to create conforming passwords quickly and correctly, users' percep tions of these approaches, and how the approaches impact the security and memorability of the resulting passwords.
We found that requirements feedback helped participants cre ate passwords meeting strict requirements without making er rors, and in some cases gave participants more confidence in the strength of their passwords. Passwords created with re quirements feedback were as strong as those without. Thus, requirements feedback may help make complex passwordcomposition requirements more palatable to users.
Compared to having participants create a password under a strict policy in a single step, both the guidance and inser tion techniques led to a reduction in password security. While user sentiment toward the process of creating passwords with guidance was more positive than creating a password with out guidance, the resulting passwords were less likely to ex ceed the stated requirements and more likely to be cracked after a large number of guesses. Likewise, randomly insert ing a few characters into passwords leaves them vulnerable to having those characters brute-forced. Overall, our results demonstrate that looking only at password requirements is in sufficient. The presentation of those requirements can affect usability and security.
Next, we present related work and then our research ques tions and methodology. Then, we discuss our results and their practical implications.
RELATED WORK
Password-composition policies often include requirements on character length and content. Furnell found that the password restrictions of 10 popular websites were highly variable and sometimes conflicted [6, 7] . Recent studies compared the us ability and security of passwords adhering to various policies. Many such studies collect passwords from the crowdsourcing service Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). In one of our previous studies, we compared the security and usability of various password policies that required more characters than is typical in practice. We found that some policies requiring longer passwords led to more usable and secure passwords than a more typical policy that required fewer characters but had other more complex requirements. However, security suffered when participants placed required uppercase letters, digits, and symbols at the start and end of their passwords, and included common substrings and keyboard patterns [15] . Our current research builds on this work by examining mech anisms intended to make password requirements that prevent such predictable behavior easier for users to handle.
Several studies explored how to encourage users to choose more secure passwords. Furnell and Bär found that users chose more secure passwords when presented with text ad vice or a password-strength meter [8] . We found that more stringent-scoring meters effectively led to stronger pass words, but at the cost of usability [17] . Egelman et al. found that the mere presence of a password meter led to more se cure passwords, but only for valued accounts [3] . Rather than providing feedback in the form of a password-strength me ter, our research evaluates the impact of providing real-time feedback on compliance with requirements.
Forget et al. explored persuading users to create more secure passwords by adding random characters to user-created pass words. Users could shuffle to have a different set of ran dom characters placed at different locations. The authors found that inserting two characters increased password secu rity without perceptibly affecting usability. Adding more than two characters resulted in decreased usability but no more security, since users would select weaker pre-improvement passwords to compensate for the increased memory load of additional characters [5] . Our research builds on this with a condition that also inserts random characters into partici pants' passwords. We use a much larger sample size, and test recall after a few days as well as a few minutes.
Moshfeghian and Ryu found that many popular websites poorly present password restrictions. The authors suggest best practices for password-creation design. Their advice includes placing password guidance and feedback in clear and concise language in close proximity to password fields, providing real-time feedback to reduce failed attempts, us ing red-colored feedback for unfulfilled requirements, and us ing globally recognizable visual elements (e.g., green check marks) to communicate feedback [12] . Our study's presen tation of password requirements follows these best practices and provides empirical evidence of their effectiveness.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Our four research questions examine how strict password re quirements can be made more usable through visual elements, requirements feedback, guidance, and automatic insertion of random characters. Our base set of strict requirements re quires that passwords contain at least 12 characters and three character classes (three of either lowercase letters, uppercase letters, digits, or symbols).
Question Q 1 : How do the blacklist and pattern requirements affect password security and usability when applied to strict requirements? The blacklist requirement prohibits passwords from containing any substring in a blacklist. Pattern requires that passwords begin and end with a lowercase letter. These requirements are grounded in prior work that has found users often include common substrings in passwords, and often begin and end them with required non-lowercase character classes [15] . Based on previous findings [9, 15] , we expected adding either requirement to the base requirement would in crease strength and decrease usability. We examined the effects of this requirements feedback on password security and usability.
Question Q 4 : Does a three-step password-creation process, using either guidance or insertion, make it easier to create passwords that have strict requirements? We compared three conditions with the base and pattern requirements that in cluded requirements feedback. One condition asked partic ipants to create passwords in a single step, while two con ditions used three steps. In one of the three-step conditions, we guided participants through a password-creation process (guidance) such that they created a simple password and then were asked to add more characters. In the other three-step condition, participants created a simple password and then we randomly inserted two more characters (insertion).
METHODOLOGY
In this section, we discuss our data collection and analysis procedures, which were approved by our institutional review board. Our experimental protocol is based on a protocol used successfully to contrast password-composition policies in prior research [9, 15] .
We conducted an online between-subjects study on Ama zon's Mechanical Turk crowdsourcing service (MTurk) in two parts. Participants were informed that this would be a two-part study with additional compensation for completing both parts. We paid participants 55 cents for completing Part One and 70 cents for completing Part Two. In Part One, we asked participants to imagine they were creating a new pass word for their email account. The requirements and feedback varied by condition. Participants then completed a short sur vey before we asked them to recall their password. In Part Two, we emailed participants two days later and invited them to recall their password and complete a second survey.
Except when looking at dropout rates, our analysis includes only participants who completed Part One. For metrics spe cific to Part Two, we consider only participants who returned We also measured password strength using a state-of-the-art password cracker, as described below.
Conditions
Conditions, listed in Table 1 , were assigned round-robin. They share the base requirements -that passwords have at least 12 characters and three character classes. Prior work suggests these are usable yet strong requirements [15] .
Password Creation in One Step
Base used the base requirements. Pattern required passwords to begin and end with lowercase letters, as shown in Figure 3 . Blacklist required that passwords not contain substrings from a 41,329-string blacklist. This blacklist was based on com mon substrings in cracked passwords in a prior study [15] and substrings we thought would be easily guessed. The blacklist prohibited:
• 123!, amazon, character, monkey Base rt , Blacklist rt , and Pattern rt are analogues of the above conditions, except they employ requirements feedback. As participants entered their passwords, listed requirements were accompanied with either a green check mark (for a fulfilled requirement) or a red message indicating why the require ment is not fulfilled. Figure 4 shows Pattern rt . To keep these conditions similar to their analogous conditions without re quirements feedback, participants were permitted to submit non-compliant passwords (and then were told that they would have to try again to create a compliant password). All conditions except Base-plain were displayed with Carnegie Mellon University's branding (colors, fonts, and wordmark). Base-plain is identical to Base, except it employs no branding, instead using default black-and-white HTML rendering, in order to address Q 2 .
Password Creation in Three Steps
Two conditions -Guide and Insert -employed a three-step password-creation process. Both used requirements feed back and led to passwords meeting the same requirements as Pattern rt . Figures 5 and 6 show the first two steps of Guide and Insert. The main difference between them is that Insert has a step in which the system randomly inserts characters into the password, while Guide instructs participants to insert additional characters.
In
Step 1, we asked participants, "To start, please enter a pass word with at least 10 characters. It can be a word, and it needs to start and end with a lowercase letter." In Step 2, passwords were enhanced to meet the requirements of Pat tern. In Guide, participants were shown their password in an editable text field and asked to enhance the password until meeting the requirements. In the second step for Insert, par ticipants were shown their system-enhanced password, with the two newly added characters in green text. Below, partic ipants were shown a text box with their non-enhanced pass word in plaintext, and were asked to modify it to match what was above. Finally, in
Step 3, we asked participants to con firm their passwords in a blank password text field. To insert two random characters in Insert, we first selected two characters of two different character classes, chosen from nine symbols @!$ * #. − & , eight digits, and 24 uppercase letters (removing O, 0, I, and 1, since they may be confused with each other). We then inserted these characters between the first ten characters of the initial password. There are 960 different ways to choose characters of two different character classes from these three sets (with order mattering). There are 45 different ways to select two spaces between the first ten characters. Thus, there are 960 × 45 = 43, 200 different ways of inserting characters.
Statistical Testing
We perform omnibus tests to detect whether our conditions differ from one another. When they do, we perform a set of corrected pairwise tests. Rather than testing each pair of conditions, we test selected pairs to help answer our research questions. The pairwise comparisons are as follows. Q 1 : Base-Blacklist; Base-Pattern; Blacklist-Pattern Q 2 : Base-Base-plain
We use a significance level α = .05. Quantitative tests use Kruskal-Wallis (KW) for omnibus testing and Holm Bonferroni-corrected (HC) Mann-Whitney U (MW) for pairwise testing. For their effect size, we used the "common lan guage effect size" [10] . This is the probability that a random participant from one condition has a more favorable value than a random participant from the other condition. 
Measuring Password Strength
To measure password strength, we calculated guess num bers [9] for each password. A guess number is an esti mate of the number of guesses that an attacker would require to guess successfully a participant's study password. This simulates an offline attack, in which an attacker has stolen a hashed password file and can make a number of guesses bounded only by computation speed and hardware availabil ity. A sophisticated attacker will start by guessing the most likely passwords and proceed in order of decreasing proba bility. To generate guess numbers, we used the probabilistic context-free grammar (PCFG) password-cracking technique introduced by Weir et al. [20] and updated in subsequent work [9, 15] . The PCFG algorithm trains on structures and character strings from existing password corpora, creating a lookup table up to a certain given number of guesses. We trained the cracker on public data including words from the Google corpus [1] , the Openwall cracking dictionary, 2 and the leaked MySpace [13] and RockYou [18] datasets. We also trained our strings on passwords collected during pre vious passwords-research studies.
We used the PCFG algorithm to make guesses with at least twelve characters and three character classes, as required by all of our conditions. Some of our conditions required pass words to begin and end with a lowercase letter; these were trained as a separate group and only made guesses starting and ending with a lowercase letter. We divided each group of passwords into two subsets and used one as training data to crack the other (two folds). This simulated an attacker with access to passwords created under similar requirements. We generated at least 2 × 10 13 guesses per condition.
Insert asked participants to create a password of at least ten characters that started and ended with a lowercase letter. The system then added random characters of 43,200 different pos sible combinations. The traditional PCFG approach was inef fective against Insert, cracking only one password after 10 12 guesses. We then used a better-targeted approach for our security results. We used the PCFG algorithm to crack the pre-enhancement passwords, and then multiplied the num ber of guesses by 43,200. This simulated an attacker who 2 openwall.org knows the random-character insertion algorithm and bruteforces through all possible permutations.
Limitations
Limitations of our method of studying password-composition policies have been discussed in prior papers employing a sim ilar approach [9, 15] . As with any MTurk study, there is a con cern about external validity, since participants created pass words for use only within the context of the study, and thus the passwords held little value to participants. However, two recent studies suggest that experimental studies may be a rea sonable way to examine actual password behavior. Mazurek et al. contrasted characteristics of MTurk studies with gen uine university passwords. They found that study passwords were very similar to university passwords across a number of metrics, suggesting that MTurk passwords were viable for learning about actual user behavior [11] . Fahl et al. also com pared genuine university passwords with study passwords and found that the password sets resembled each other [4] .
Our methodology is also temporally limited. We looked at password recall after a few minutes and after a few days. Ac tual password usage can involve using a password long af ter its creation, which we did not examine. We did not test every possible permutation of password requirements, guid ance, and feedback. It is possible that other feedback formats would interact differently with other sets of requirements. In addition, we only tested one example of guidance and one of insertion. Our branding only included plain branding and that of a university. It is possible that some more dramatic branding scheme would have made a bigger difference.
RESULTS
This section presents our findings. We discuss our partici pants, followed by password strength, and then usability re sults for password creation and recall. Table 2 summarizes results for password creation, Table 3 summarizes password characteristics, and Table 2 : Password-creation metrics and comparisons. For each metric, we provide an average value, the result of a significance test, and the effect size (as described in the Methodology). For significant comparisons, the significantly better value is in bold. Table 3 : Password characteristics and comparisons. Exceed min class is exceeding the minimum number of character classes.
Password Strength
We observe an overall cracking rate of 21.7% after 2 × 10 13 guesses, varying significantly by condition, as shown in Ta ble 3. The percentage of passwords cracked after each guess is shown in Figure 7 . As observed in Table 3 , we found no ef fect of real-time requirements-compliance feedback on pass word strength (see Q 3 ). On the other hand, both Pattern and Blacklist performed better than Base, and Pattern performed better than Blacklist (see Q 1 ).
Passwords created under Pattern rt were significantly less likely to be cracked than those created under Guide or In sert. Thus our three-step password creation processes both decreased password strength compared to creating a pass word with the same requirements in a single step (see Q 4 ).
While Insert was vulnerable to the partial-brute-force ap proach described in the Methodology, it did perform well against a more traditional PCFG attack. Using a traditional PCFG approach, after 10 12 guesses (we did not continue to 10 13 ), over 5% of each other condition had been cracked, compared to 0.1% of Insert. However, Insert appeared much weaker once we instead applied PCFG to its pre-splice pass words and multiplied the resulting guess numbers by the to tal number of splicings, 43,200, to simulate brute-forcing the possible splicings. We see that using a relatively small amount of random text to increase password strength is vul nerable to being brute-forced.
We used nine symbols, chosen to be distinct and easy to rec ognize. While increasing the number of symbols would have increased security, it would not have been substantial. Using 19 symbols rather than nine would have resulted in 72,000 insertion configurations instead of 43,200. Using 32 symbols would have led to 109,440 configurations. Using the same cracking technique, using 32 symbols would lead to a crack ing rate of 26.1%, compared to the current 28.6%.
Exceeding Minimum Requirements
In addition to looking at results of the PCFG cracker, we looked at the structural components of passwords. While all passwords required 12 characters and three characters classes, participants were free to exceed either requirement. Table 4 : User-behavior metrics and comparisons. The percentage of passwords cracked in each con dition by the number of guesses made in log scale. Our cutoff for guess numbers is 2 × 10 13 . Table 3 shows comparisons.
ticipants were more likely to exceed the minimum than those in Guide or Insert. In addition, participants in all three realtime-feedback conditions were less likely to use four char acter classes than those in the same conditions without realtime feedback. This may be due to participants with real-time feedback feeling that they are "done" once they see the green check mark beside the requirement (see Q 3 ).
Although all conditions required a minimum of 12 characters, 59.1% of participants created longer passwords, with a mean password length of 13.8 characters. Length by condition and significant differences are shown in Table 3 . While both Guide and Insert had shorter passwords than Pattern rt (see Q 4 ), we did not see significant length differences between conditions with and without real-time feedback.
Previous work found that increasing password length by one lowercase letter makes a password 70% as likely to be guessed [11] . Thus, the length difference between Pattern rt and the three-step conditions may contribute substantially to the security differences between these conditions. To measure perception of how feedback affected password se curity, we asked our participants whether they agreed with the statement, "The feedback and instructions I saw while creat ing my password led me to create a stronger password than I would have otherwise." Figure 8 shows the responses. The only significant pairwise differences were that Pattern rt par ticipants (84.3%) were more likely to agree than those in ei ther Pattern (74.2%) or Insert (67.4%) (HC FET, p<.001). A possible explanation for the low agreement from Insert partic ipants is that they anticipated creating a weaker initial pass word, because they expected to have its strength increased. Alternatively, they may not have perceived much security in adding two random characters (see Q 4 ).
We asked participants whether they agreed with, "If my main email provider had the same password requirements as used in this study, my email account would be more secure. " Fig  ure 8 shows responses. Pattern rt participants (64.9%) were more likely to agree than Insert participants (51.2%) (HC FET, p<.001). 79.6% of participants indicated that their pri mary email account was from a web email provider. The low agreement is surprising because the study requirements are much more demanding than most web email providers. 
Usability
This section presents results for usability metrics and selfreported sentiment. We begin by focusing on the passwordcreation process, and then Part One and Part Two recall.
Password Creation
To understand password creation, we look at self-reported user sentiment, password-creation time, and how participants failed to create a password meeting their requirements. Then, we look at the effects of web-page branding.
Password-Creation Sentiment Figure 9 illustrates participants' agreement with password creation being difficult and annoying respectively, with pairwise differences in agreement shown in Table 2 . We did not detect any significant difference in perceived passwordcreation difficulty or annoyance between a condition and its real-time-feedback counterpart. Thus, our real-time feedback did not cause participants to perceive password creation as any more or less difficult or annoying (see Q 3 ). Creating a password under Pattern rt was both more difficult and more annoying than doing so under either Guide or Insert. This suggests that our three-step conditions reduced the difficulty and annoyance of the pattern requirement (see Q 4 ). Table 2 shows significant differences in how long participants took creating their passwords. Pattern rt took significantly less time than Guide but significantly more time than Insert. This may be due to the fact that Insert participants did not have to decide which special characters to include (see Q 4 ). Requirements feedback helped participants create passwords in Pattern rt more quickly than in Pattern (see Q 3 ). Table 2 compares how many errors participants made while creating a password in each condition. We consider creation errors a metric of password-creation difficulty. We observe that requirements feedback helps participants successfully create a password with fewer errors for all three pairs of con ditions with requirements feedback. This suggests that realtime requirements-compliance feedback helps participants to adhere to strict password requirements (see Q 3 ).
Password-Creation Time

Password-Creation Errors
To understand the impact of guiding and insertion (see Q 4 ), we examined the errors participants made when creating pass words in each of our four conditions with the pattern re quirement. Pattern had the highest error rate, with an av erage of 1.5 creation errors per participant. The most com mon error was failure to meet the pattern requirement, with an average of 1.1 such errors per participant. With the addi tion of real-time feedback, Pattern rt participants made sig nificantly fewer errors: .6 overall errors and .3 pattern er rors each. While Guide participants had a significantly lower dropout rate and reported finding password creation easier and less annoying than Pattern rt participants, they did not make significantly fewer errors or create their passwords more quickly. We saw similar sentiment improvements for Insert participants, and significant improvement in passwordcreation time, without a reduction in overall error rate. Insert participants averaged .7 errors and .07 pattern errors. This suggests that requirements feedback reduces the high error rate associated with the pattern requirement, but our threestep approaches did not result in further error-rate reductions.
Effects of Branding
We did not observe any significant effects of the university branding (see Q 2 ). To understand the impact of branding, we looked for the presence of context-related keywords in Base and Base-plain. Base was more likely to contain keywords related to the university (1.3% to 0.7%), 3 but the difference was not significant (χ 2 =0.73, p=0.393). On the other hand, Base-plain passwords were more likely to contain generic study-related keywords, 4 (2.3% to 1.0%) but this was also not significant (χ 2 =3.198, p=0.074).
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Part One Recall
Participants were asked to recall their passwords in Part One after completing a brief survey. 92.9% of participants did so correctly on the first try, taking 1.1 attempts on average, with significant pairwise differences between conditions. The me dian time for Part One recall was 11 seconds, and significant differences are shown in Table 4 . Passwords in Pattern took significantly more time to enter than those in either Base or Blacklist. This may indicate participants struggling more to remember or type passwords created under these conditions.
Part Two Recall
This section looks at data from the 3,934 participants who re turned for Part Two within three days of being invited. 59.9% of participants successfully entered their password on the first attempt, and this did not vary significantly by condition (χ 2 8 =13.844, p=.086), as shown in Table 4 .
Participants who mentioned storing their passwords in the surveys, or whom we detected pasting or autofilling during password recall, are considered storage participants. Others are no-storage participants. 58.5% of returned participants are storage participants, with significant differences shown in Table 3 . Insert participants were more likely to be storage participants than those in Pattern rt . Those in Pattern were more likely to do so than participants in Base or Blacklist.
It appears that the pattern requirement, and the insertion of random characters, cause participants to be less able to mem orize their passwords, or at least anticipate being less able and therefore write them down. 57.1% of no-storage participants entered their passwords successfully in one attempt, and this did not vary by condition (χ 2 =12.189, p=0.143).
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We asked whether participants had already used their study passwords. 74.1% indicated creating a new one, and 23.0% indicated using a similar password. Few (4.4%) reused a password exactly, likely because our requirements differ from most service providers. Pattern participants were more likely to create a brand new password (84.0%) than Base (76.7%) or Blacklist (79.2%). This may help explain why Pattern par ticipants were more likely to store their passwords.
We asked participants whether they agreed with the state ment, "Remembering the password I used for this study was difficult." Table 4 shows significant differences. Pattern was more difficult to recall than either Base or Blacklist.
DISCUSSION
We address our research questions in light of our findings.
Q1: Impact of blacklist and pattern requirements
As expected, the blacklist and pattern requirements increase password strength but decrease usability. Furthermore, the pattern requirement leads to more security but less usability than the blacklist requirement. As shown in Table 3 , Base passwords were significantly more likely to be cracked after 2 × 10 13 guesses than Blacklist, which in turn were signifi cantly more likely to be cracked than Pattern.
Among these conditions, Pattern proved least usable: par ticipants had more difficulty both creating and recalling their passwords. Pattern participants were error-prone in password creation, and they reported finding password creation both difficult and annoying at significantly higher rates (Table 2) . Participants in this condition also spent more time recalling their passwords in Part One and were more likely to store their passwords (Table 3 ). While error rates during Part Two recall did not differ significantly, Pattern participants were more likely to report difficulty in Part Two recall (Table 4) .
Usability differences between Blacklist and Base were less pronounced and generally limited to password creation. Adding a blacklist requirement may increase security with out making password recall significantly more difficult.
Q2: Impact of branded look-and-feel
We originally thought that branding would help users to re member their password (among the many other passwords people must routinely manage), although security could suf fer if users created passwords that included words related to a brand. However, we found no evidence for a difference be tween branded and plain presentation in any of our analyses.
While we found no difference with the branding we used, a different visual presentation might have had more impact. Our branded design contained no images other than a univer sity wordmark. Branding that included images, or a brand that was more familiar to participants, may have had a dif ferent effect. Further investigation into the effects of stronger branding on password behavior could prove interesting.
Q3: Impact of password-creation feedback
Our findings show some upside and limited downside to giv ing participants requirements feedback. We found that re quirements feedback made password creation less error-prone for all three pairs of conditions we compared.
As shown in Table 3 , requirements feedback participants were less likely to use a fourth character class. This may be due to the feedback giving users the feeling of being "done." In con ditions without requirements feedback, participants may not have realized when the requirements were met and so added additional character classes to be sure. While this trend could potentially have some adverse effect on security, we found no significant difference in guessability after 2 × 10 13 guesses.
Requirements feedback seems reduce user error, an increase in perception of strength, and little to no impact on password security. Thus, requirements feedback seems to be a useful feature to add to password-creation interfaces.
Q4: Impact of guiding and insertion
We tested the impact of our three-step conditions by compar ing Pattern rt with both Guide and Insert. All three conditions had the same requirements. The latter two used an interactive three-step process to create the password over several steps.
Participants in Guide and Insert both found password creation less annoying and difficult than Pattern rt , as seen in Table 2 . They were also more likely to complete Part One of the study. Despite all three conditions enforcing the same requirements, passwords in Guide and Insert were significantly more likely to be cracked than those in Pattern rt -over twice as likely in the case of Insert (Table 3 ). This demonstrates that looking only at password-composition requirements is insufficient to paint an accurate picture of resulting security.
Participants in the three-step conditions made shorter pass words with fewer character classes (Table 3) , resulting in more easily cracked passwords. One possible explanation is that participants did not feel a sense of ownership over their passwords. Prior research suggests that passwords are a way that users feel personal responsibility for computer se curity [14] . Perhaps this sense of ownership and responsibil ity was diminished because the system was more of an active participant in the process. Another explanation is that users may have trusted that the system was helping them create a strong password, and focused on following the instructions rather than on trying to increase password security.
Further research might explore whether other ways of guid ing participants through password-creation can retain usabil ity gains without sacrificing security. For example, a varia tion on Guide might ask participants to create a simple pass word with at least 11 characters, rather than 10, to account for the fact that participants following a traditional one-step password-creation process are more likely to exceed mini mum length requirements. Alternatively, the guidance might encourage participants to exceed minimum requirements by telling them that this is a good way to increase the security of their password. Guide specifically told participants to add "two more characters to the middle of your password" and did not suggest that they could add more. Overall, we observe that the details associated with password-creation instructions matter and that instructions and procedures should be tested to determine their impact on both usability and security.
CONCLUSION
We evaluated three approaches to help users cope with strict password-composition policies: requirements feedback, guidance, and insertion. We found that requirements feed back helps prevent user errors while creating strong pass words. Our multi-step password-creation processes -guid ance and insertion -made password-creation easier, but re sulted in weaker passwords. While prior passwords research often focused on which sets of requirements lead to strong passwords, most past research has not looked at the impact of presentation and instructions (beyond password meters), or at ways to help users cope with strict requirements. We be lieve these findings will be valuable to service providers who wish to make their increasingly strict password-composition requirements easier for users to swallow.
